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10786 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
In February of 1950 appellants' predecessor m 
interest filed a request with the State Engineer for an 
extension of time within which to resume the use of a 
decreed water right. This request was subsequently 
granted. In February of 1955 the State Engineer, after 
giving notice that proof of resumption of use was due, 
1 
advised the applicant that the water right was forfeited 
for failure to submit proof of resumption of use. This 
action was filed in 1964 to determine the validity of 
this water right. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court held that the right had been for-
feited. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant and intervenor submit that the deci-
sion of the lower court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Most of the documentary evidence in this case was 
contained on the application for extension of time with-
in which to resume use of water. This is Application 
No. 38 on the records in the State Engineer's office 
(Defendants' Exhibit No. 3). Appellants have set 
forth some of the documents contained on this file but 
there are others that are also necessary to the resolution 
of this matter which are not referred to in appellants' 
statement of facts. Respondents submit that the follow-
ing is a more correct and complete statement of the 
facts contained on Defendants' Exhibit No. 3 and these 
facts are set forth in chronological order: 
Application for extension of time within which 
to resume the use of water evidenced by Award 
2 
No. 228 in the case of Utah Power & Light Co. 
v. Richmond Irrigation Co., was filed by Logan 
Flour .Mills, Inc., February 15, 1950, stating 
water was last used on January 12, 1946, and 
requesting an extension to and including J anu-
ary 1, 1955 within which to again resume the use 
of water under this right. The applicant stated 
that this extension was necessary because its 
flour mill had been destroyed by fire and the 
applicant needed additional time to obtain financ-
ing to rebuild the mill. 
This application, Number 38, on the records 
of the State Engineer, was approved May 23, 
1 !)50 and an extension granted to and including 
.January 1, 1955. 
On October 27, 1954 the State Engineer, by 
registered mail, advised applicant that the exten-
sion of time would expire January 1, 1955. 
A letter dated November 19, 1954 was re-
ceived in the State Engineer's office from 
Crowther Bros. Milling Company, stating they 
now owned this water right and requesting addi-
tional information in connection with proof of 
resumption of use. 
The State Engineer, by letter dated November 
30, 1954, adYised Crowther Bros. Milling Com-
pany that proof of resumption of use in affidavit 
form would have to be submitted on or before 
January 1, 1955 or that a new application for 
additional time be filed. The State Engineer 
also advised Crowther Bros. that it would be 
necessary to submit evidence of ownership of the 
right. 
On December 31. 19.54 the State Engineer 
received a letter dated December 29, 1964 from 
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Crowther Bros. Milling Company advising him 
that electrical equipment had been installed and 
that they would be utilizing water for generation 
of power. This letter also stated that: "This 
will actually be running on the thirtieth." The 
letter gave a description of the property con-
tained in the deed from Logan Flour Mills tu 
Crowther Bros. Milling Company. However, the 
deed was not submitted with this letter. 
The Attorney General's office by letter dated 
January 8, 1955 advised Crowther Bros. Milling 
Company that the submission of a verified state-
ment setting forth the date on which the use of 
water was resumed was mandatory under the 
statute. The letter further advised the Company 
that when proof of resumption of use was not 
submitted the water right ceased and reverted 
to the public and the State Engineer could only 
endorse his records accordingly. 
The State Engineer received a letter from 
Crowther Bros., dated February 3, 1955 stating 
that: "For your informaton, we put the power 
into beneficial use for generating electric power 
for Logan City on December 31, 1954, and it 
has been in operation ever since." 
Proof of resumption of use on a form pro-
vided by the State Engineer was received in the 
office of the State Engineer February 10, 1955. 
On February 17, 1955 the State Engineer 
directed a letter jointly to Logan Flour Mills 
and Crowther Bros. Milling Company, advising 
the parties that the right evidenced by Award 
No. 228 had been forfeited because the applicant 
failed to submit proof of resumption of use as 
required by Section 73-1-4, U.C.A., 1953. and 
that he cmild not accept proof of resumption of 
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use after the proof due date had elapsed. The 
State Engineer further stated that unless an 
appeal was taken within 60 days the decision 
of the State Engineer would in all probability 
be final, and that the typed copy of a deed whici1 
was received on February 5, 1955 was not suffi-
cient to endorse his records to show the owner-
ship of this right by the Crowther Bros. Milling 
Company. 
On February 24, 1955 the State Engineer re-
ceived a certified copy of the deed transferring 
ownership of this right from Logan Flour Mills 
to Crowther Bros. Milling Company. 
The State Engineer, by letter dated February 
28, 1955 again stated that the right had been 
forfeited and that if the applicant desired to 
review the Engineer's February 17th decision 
an appeal would have to be taken to the District 
Court within 60 days of that decision. 
A letter was received by the State Engineer 
on March 2, 1955 from Crowther Bros. Milling 
Company stating the water had been put to use 
a.nd asking the Engineer to reconsider his deci-
s10n. 
On March 7, 1955 the State Engineer again 
advised the applicant that he could not recon-
sider his decision and that the applicant must 
seek a timely review of the Engineer's decision 
of February 17, 1955. 
The Crowther Bros. Milling Company subsequently 
initiated a ne''' water right for use in this plant. Appli-
cation to Appropriate No. 26793 (Defendants' Exhibit 
No. 4) was filed March rn, 19.55 by Crowther Bros. 
Milling Company and sought to appropriate 87 second-
5 
feet of water for power generation. The State Engi-
neer approved this filing for 71.5 second-feet and it 
is presently in good standing in the Engineer's office. 
While it was stipulated (Tr. 3 and 4) that on 
December 30 and 31, 1954 power was being generated 
at appellants' plant, respondents deny that there is any 
competent evidence in the record as to the quantity of 
water diverted. The testimony of Junius Crowther 
(Tr. 6) which is cited on page 8 of appellants' brief 
as evidence of the fact that sixty to sixty-five feet of 
water went through the generators, was stricken on 
cross examination when this witness testified his opinion 
was based on information furnished him by an engineer 
rather than his own judgment (Tr. 9). 
This same information was again elicited on re-
direct examination (Tr. 10 and 11). However, on 
recross the witness admitted his opinion was based on 
information furnished him later by an engineer and 
absent that information he had no opinion (Tr. 11). 
Another motion was made to strike his testimony (Tr. 
12) and the court took this motion under advisement 
(Tr. 13). The engineer referred to by Mr. Crowther 
was later called as a witness by appellant and testified 
that he did not recall making any measurements at the 
power plant until December 3, 1960 (Tr. 24). This 
was approximately six years after Mr. Crowther ob-
served this initial flow of water into the power plant. 
Mr. Jibson, the engineer who made the measurement, 
further testified that Mr. Crowther was not present 
when he made his measurements in 1960 (Tr. 24) . 
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It appears that appellants' position in this matter 
raises three general questions. First, whether the for-
feiture statute was applicable at all in this fact situation 
and, secondly, if the statute was applicable did the 
appropriator comply with it. And, finally, whether 
the State Engineer's decision holding that the right 
had been forfeited for failure to submit proof was 
beyond his authority and, therefore, void. \Ve will dis-
cuss these questions in this order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 73-1-J, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, ARE AP-
PLICABLE \VHERE THE l\IEANS OF BENE-
FICIALLY USING A \VATER RIGHT HATE 
BEEN DESTROYED HY FIRE AND THE 
O\VNER OF THE RIGHT DOES NOT RE-
SUl\IE THE USE OF \V ATER \VITHIN FIYE 
YEARS OR REQUEST AN EXTENSION OF 
TIME \VITHIN \VHICH TO RESUME THE 
USE OF THE \VATER. 
Appellants' position that the prov1s1011s of the 
forfeiture statute do not apply to non use of water 
resulting from fire is untenable. Appellants have point-
ed to 110 express exception in the statute and this is 
simply because the statute makes no exceptions. Sec-
tion 73-1-4<, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
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Such applications for extension shall be grant-
ed by the state engineer for periods not exceed-
ing five years each, upon a showing of reasonable 
cause for nonuse. Financial crisis, industrial 
depression, operation of legal proceedings or 
other unavoidable cause, . . . shall constitute 
reasonable cause for such nonuse. 
Application within which to resume use of water 
No. 38 (Paragraph 14 of Defendants' Exhibit No. 3) 
states that the water could no longer be used because 
the Flour Mill had been destroyed by fire and it was 
contemplated that a new modern mill would be built 
as soon as possible. The applicant further stated diffi-
culties in obtaining financing had prevented a rebuild-
ing at the time the application was filed in 1950. This 
situation is clearly within the purview of the forfeiture 
statute. It was to avoid this very type of hardship that 
the legislature provided for these extensions. 
Nor do we believe there is any question as to when 
the statute began to run as appellants suggest. The 
statute expressly provides that when the appropriator 
ceases to use the water its provisions apply. This relates 
solely to when the beneficial use of the water stopped 
and has nothing to do with when the fire goes out. 
Application No. 38 recites that the water was last used 
on January 12, 1946 as that was the morning the mill 
burned down (Paragraph 12, Application No. 38 of 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 3). However, the fact is 
that within five years of the last use of this water right 
the appropriator properly filed an application within 
which to resume use. The applicant specifically re-
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quested an extension to .January 1, 1955 (Paragraph 
1:3 of Application No. 38, Defendants' Exhibit No. 3) 
which the State Engineer subsequently granted (Para-
graph Hi of the State Engineer's endorsements on 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 3). The appropriator elected 
to take advantage of the provisions of this statute to 
preserve his water right and he of all people should 
be bound by this election. 
Further, we submit that the cases cited by appel-
lants do not stand for the broad proposition that there 
must be a voluntary failure to use the water on the 
part of the appropriator in order for a forfeiture to 
oecur. The Utah Act certainly makes no such provision. 
In the cases of New }}J erL'ico Products Co. v. New 
Jfc,rico Power Company, 42 N. M. 311, 77 P. 2d 634 
( 1937) and 1lf orris v. Bean, 146 F. 423 ( Hl06), the 
water did not reach the appropriator because it was 
rliYerted by an upstream user. The Utah statute ex-
pressly states that use by another user without a right 
eauses a forfeiture of the water right. The case of 
Scherck v. Nichols, 55 'Vyo. 4, 95 P. 2d 74 ( 1939), 
was presented to the court on an abandonment theory. 
There was no discussion of forfeiture. 'Ve will concede 
that abandonment must be voluntary. In Rarnsa.IJ v. 
Gottsche, 51 ~Tyo. 516, 69 P. 2d 535 (1937), floods 
for a period of successive years destroyed the appro-
priator's ditches and dams so the water was no longer 
arnila ble at his original point of diversion. However, 
tlw court concluded that it was not necessary to con-
dusiyely decide whether this was sufficient grounds 
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for nonuse because there was evidence that the water 
had been used during the period in question. In the 
cases of Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln 
Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P. 2d 572 (1939) and 
Rocky Ford Irrigation Company v. Kents Lake Res-
ervoir Company, 104 Utah 202, 135 P. 2d 108 (1943), 
there was not sufficient natural flow in the stream to 
satisfy the priority rights alleged to have been forfeited. 
The court concluded that where the appropriator was 
ready and able to use the water he could not be penal-
ized because nature failed to supply it. We think these 
situations are clearly distinguishable from this case. 
Here the water was available at the appropriator's point 
of diversion and could have been diverted at any time 
had the mill been reconstructed. The appropriator 
stated in the application to resume use that it was lack 
of finances that prevented the use of this water. \Ve 
would also like to point out that much of the discussion 
concerning voluntary nonuse of water in the above 
cases took place in connection with the court's dis-
cussion of abandonment rather than forfeiture. For· 
feiture and abandonment are two distinct legal con· ' 
cepts. 
The forfeiture of a water right under the Utah 
statute occurs not as the result of any intention on the 
part of the owner to forsake the right but rather it 
comes about by failure to use the water for the period 
prescribed by the statute. As this court has previously 
noted the abandonment of a water right is based on 
failure to use plus an intent to abandon. Promontory 
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Ranch Company v. Argile, 28 Utah 398, 79 Pac. 47 
( 1904) . However, forfeiture occurs absent an intent 
to give up the right artid can be involuntary. This con-
cept is noted in Hutchins, Selected Problems in the 
Law of Water Rights in the West, United States De-
partment of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publication 
No. 418 (1942) at page 395, wherein he quotes from 
the then recent Utah case of Hammond v. Johnson, 
94 Utah 20, 66 P. 2d 894 (1937): 
And the Supreme Court of Utah recently stated: 
Abandonment is not based upon a time ele-
ment and mere nonuser will not establish aban-
donment for any less time, at least, than the 
statutory period. The controlling element in 
abandonment is a matter of intent. * * * * There 
can be no abandonment of a water right unless 
there is a concurrence of the acts of the party 
with his intent to desert, forsake, or abandon 
the right. A forfeiture for nonuser during the 
statutory time may occur despite a specific intent 
not to surrender the right. It is based not upon 
an act done, or an intent had but upon a failure 
to use the right for the statutory time. 
Forfeiture, therefore, can be involuntary; 
abandonment is necessarily voluntary and inten-
tional. 
The very purpose of the legislature in insuring the 
continued beneficial use of water by a forfeiture statute 
would be circumvented if the forfeiture had to be 
voluntary. As stated by Kinney, in his work on Irri-
,!Jation and Water Rights (2d ed. 1912) Vol. 2 § 1120, 
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when discussing the construction of statutes providing 
for forfeiture of water rights: 
These statutes fixing the maximum time limit 
for the nonuser of a water right, where free from 
ambiguity, should be strictly construed by the 
courts. Such an act should be strictly construed, 
and a case clearly made out before any relief 
should be extended to the delinquent thereunder. 
"When a statute gives a new and unusual rem-
edy, and directs how the right to the remedy is 
to be acquired or enjoyed, and how it is to be 
enforced, the Act should be strictly construed; 
and the validity of all acts done under the 
authority of such an Act will depend upon the 
compliance with its terms. In respect to such 
Acts, the steps pointed out for the acquisition, 
presen·ation, and enforcement of the remedies 
provided should be construed as mandatory 
rather than optional." Campbellsville Lumber 
Co. v. Hubbert, 112 Fed. Rep. 718, 50 C.C.A. 
435. 
Under the law of this state when a water right 
is forfeited and reverts to the public existing rights 
on the stream are entitled to the distribution of this 
increased supply. 
Even though title were to revert to the public, 
it is unlikely that it would be available for ap-
propriation by filing with the State Engineer 
for on practically every stream in this state there 
are junior appropriators whose applications haYe 
bee1~ approved by the State Engineer for a total 
of more water than ordinarily is available in the 
stream. The reversion of thi~ water would then 
go to feed those rights of the junior appropri-
ators. TVellsville East Field Irri. Co. v. Lindsay 
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Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P. 2d 
634 (1943). 
The intervenor in this action does not claim to be 
the owner of any water rights, it only exists to assist 
its members who are water right owners in the distri-
bution of their rights. Certainly the intervenor has 
sufficient standing in this action to protect this interest 
of its members since under the above announced rule 
of law these users would be the beneficiaries of this 
forfeiture. 
POINT II. 
WHEN THE APPLICANT FAILED TO 
SUBMIT PROOF OF RESUMPTION OF USE 
ON APPLICATION 'iVITHIN WHICH TO RE-
SUME USE NO. 38 ON OR BEFORE JANU-
ARY 1, 1955, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 
73-1-4, U.C.A., 1953, THE 'iV ATER RIGHT WAS 
FORFEITED AS A MATTER OF LA,iV. 
Turning now to the question of whether the appli-
cant's action complied with the statutory requirements 
of proof of resumption of use. Appellants' predecessor 
failed to use water under this right for a period of 
approximately nine years by taking advantage of the 
provisions of Section 73-1-4. After having received 
the benefits of this section appellants now seek to avoid 
the obligations of the statute. 
The portion of Section 73-1-4, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, dealing with proof of resumption of use 
specifies that: 
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, Sixty d_ays bef o_re the expiration of any period 
of ~~tension of. time, the State Engineer shall 
notify the applicant by registered mail of the 
date when such period of extension will expire. 
Before such date of expiration such applica11t 
shall file a verified statement with the State En-
gineer settin,q forth the date on which use of 
water was resumed, and such further informa-
tion as may be relevant and be required by the 
blank form which shall be furnished by the State 
Engineer for said purpose, or such applicant 
shall make application for further extension of 
time in which to resume use of water as provided 
in this section, otherwise such water right shall 
cease and thereupon the water shall revert to 
the public. (Emphasis added). 
The requirements of proof under this statute are 
neither detailed nor complex. The submitting of a sworn 
statement stating the date on which use was resumed 
is not such a difficult task that a water user could not 
understand it. Nor is the other information required 
on the blank proof form furnished by the State Engi-
neer. There is no claim the applicant did not under-
stand what was required. Certainly there was sufficient 
notice. The notice of State Engineer dated lVfoy 23, 
1950 advising the applicant that the extension had been 
granted also stated that proof of resumption of use 
would be due January l, 1955 (Defendants' Exhibit 
No. 3). Sixty days prior to the expiration of the exten· 
sion period, the State Engineer, as required by statute, 
gave the applicant notice of what was required in order 
to submit proof of resumption of use and the conse-
quences if a proper proof was not submitted. (Letter 
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from the State Engineer dated October 27, 1954 ,on 
Defendants' Exhibit No. 3). Again on November 30, 
1954, (Letter from the State Engineer on Defendants' 
Exhibit No. 3) the Engineer, after receiving an inquiry 
from the purported new owner of the right, reiterated 
the mandatory requirements of statute with regard to 
a verified proof of resumption of use. This letter also 
advised the party claiming ownership of the right that 
proper evidence of ownership would have to be sub-
mitted. 
The only thing filed with the State Engineer prior 
to the proof due date of January 1, 1955 was a letter 
from the purported new owner stating that he intended 
to put the water to beneficial use on December 30, 1954. 
The appropriator even failed to notify the Engineer 
that use of the water was in fact resumed. Proof, on 
the form provided by the State Engineer, was not sub-
mitted until February 10, 1955. This then is not a case 
of an applicant making substantial compliance with a 
statutory requirement and then later clearing up a 
few technical points as appellants contend. The simple 
fact is that this water right was lost because there was 
a total and complete failure to comply with the require-
ments of the statute and not because of any arbitrary 
action of the State Engineer. In effect appellants con-
tend that the Engineer's action was void because he 
required compliance with a legislative mandate. If the 
court adopted appellants' reasoning in this matter 
it would have to completely disregard the language 
of this statute. 
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\:Ve submit that this situation is analogous to the 
submission of proof of appropriation on an application , 
to appropriate. lf proof is not submitted the right is 
lost. The Utah Supreme Court so held in the case of 
Mosby lrrigation Co. v. Criddle, 11 Utah 2d 41, 354 
P. 2d 8"18 (1960) In that case the court ruled that when 
the State Engineer gave the notice required by statute, 
to the owner of the right as shown by the records in 
his office, and proof was not submitted on the date due 
the application lapsed. 
The instant application lapsed by reason of 1 
the Canal Company's failure to submit proof of 
appropriation on the due date. It lapsed in ac-
cordance with the express mandate of the statute 
and not because of action of any state officer. 
Also see Duchesne County v. Humpherys, 106 Utah 
332, 148 P. 2d 338 ( 1944). \Vhen the applicant failed 
to submit proof of resumption of use the right was for-
feited as a matter of law. If this is not the case, the 
forfeiture statute in this state is a nullity. 
POINT III. 
IF THERE \:VAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRE-
TION ON THE PART OF THE STATE ENGI-
NEER IN HIS DECISION OF FEBRUARY 
17, 1955, IN REFUSING TO ACCEPT PROOF 
OF RESUlHPTION OF USE AFTER J ANU· 
ARY l, 1955, IT \VAS MANDATORY FOR THE 
APPLICANT TO TAKE AN APPEAL OF 
THAT DECISION \VITHIN SIXTY DAYS. 
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Appellants spend considerable effort attempting 
to develop the thesis that the State Engineer's action 
in refusing to accept proof of resumption of use after 
the proof due date had expired was void because (a) 
the statute didn't authorize his action or (b) if it did 
it was an unconstitutional attempt to delegate judicial 
power to an administrative officer. We have discussed 
the statutory requirements in this regard in some detail 
under Point II and respectfully submit that this statute 
does contemplate the State Engineer initially determin-
ing whether proof of resumption of use has been sub-
mitted and whether the proof is proper. Appellants con-
cede that the Engineer has certain administrative 
powers under this section but refuse to recognize that 
he can exercise his discretion with regard to his respon-
sibilities. We submit this argument is unsound as a 
matter of administrative law and is certainly counter 
to the express wording of the forfeiture statute. 
Merely because a board or commission is a 
body belonging to the executive or administra-
tive body of the government, it by no means 
follows that it may not perform functions which 
are, in their nature, judicial, and possess and 
exercise quasi-judicial powers. Statutes confer-
ring quasi-judicial powers and duties upon ad-
ministrative agencies have been held not to be 
unconstitutional as encroachments upon the ju-
dicial branch of government, especially where 
such powers and duties relate to matters which 
are peculiarly affected with public interest or 
are subject to regulation under police power~, 
or where provision is made for appeal from dec1-
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sions of such agencies to the courts. 2 Am. J ur. 
2d, Administrative Law, § 145. 
Section 73-1-4 allows the Engineer to prepare a 
proof form which requires the appropriator to submit 
additional relevant information. In this case the appro· 
priator not only failed to submit the formal proof, he 
even neglected to submit the verified statement stating 
the date that use had begun which the statute expressly 
required. 
We have never claimed the Engineer was clothed 
with judicial powers to adjudicate water rights. The 
cases which appellants cite for the proposition that 
the Engineer cannot exercise judicial powers simply 
aren't relevant. This is not a case where the Engineer 
set himself up as a court to make a water right adjudi-
cation. As we have already pointed out above the 
statute provides what shall happen when proof of ' 
resumption of use is J)Ot submitted. The right ceases. 
The Engineer's action was limited solely to the question 
of whether or not proper proof of resumption of use 
had been submitted (State Engineer's decision dated , 
February 17, 1955 on Defendants' Exhibit No. 3). 
The Engineer advised the appropriator that what had 
been submitted did not comply with the statute and 
that he could not accept proof after the proof due date 
had elapsed. Appellants' reasoning would require the 
State Engineer to accept whatever the applicant wants 
to submit in the way of proof and rubber stamp it as 
proper. However, we submit that it is a fundamental 
responsibility of the Engineer to review the proof and 
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to reject it if it does not comply with the statute. 'Ve 
do not see any valid grounds for classing this action 
as a decision beyond the State Engineer's authority. 
For purposes of argument under this point only 
and without conceding appellants' contention that there 
was substantial compliance with the proof requirements 
of the forfeiture statute, applicant's failure to appeal 
the State Engineer's decision of February 17, 1955, 
within the time allowed for such appeals precludes the 
appellants from questioning it some nine years later. 
The legislature has provided the exclusive procedure 
for review of the State Engineer's decisions where a 
party believes the Engineer has abused his discretion. 
Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states: 
In any case where a decision of the State Engi-
neer is involved any person aggrieved by such 
decision may within sixty days after notice 
thereof bring a civil action in the district court 
for a plenary review thereof. 
The State Engineer's decision specifically advised 
the appropriator that an appeal must be taken within 
this sixty-day period. In response to subsequent re-
quests by the applicant to reconsider his action the 
Engineer on two separate occasions again advised the 
appropriator that he could not reconsider this matter 
and that the applicant must appeal the Engineer's 
1lecision if he believed the Engineer had abused his 
discretion (Letters dated February 28, 1955 and March 
7. 1955 on Defendants' Exhibit No. 3). 
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This court has held that the statutory procedure 
is the exclusive method for reviewing a decision of the , 
State Engineer, Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah 517, 189 
P. 2d 701 ( 1948) . In another early decision involving 
an appeal of a decision of the State Engineer, this court 
also announced that the appeal must be taken within 
the sixty day time limit. In re Application 7600, 63 
Utah 311, 225 Pac. 605 (1924). 
Section 73-3-14 is jurisdictional m nature and 
unless the appeal is taken within the time specified 
the court is without jurisdiction to review the admiu-
istrator's decision. 
The statutes governing many administrative 
agencies or the rules of the court in which review 
is sought provide a definite time within which 
a proceeding for review may be instituted. Such 
time requirements generally must be complied 
with, application for review within the time 
specified in the statute being regarded as juris-
dictional and a proceeding not prosecuted with· 
in the time allowed may be dismussed. 2 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Administrative Law,§ 718. 
In a case involving an appeal under the Perishable 
Agricultural Commodities Act which provided for an 
appeal within 30 days after the date of an adverse order 
of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Federal Court sus· 
tained the dismissal of an appeal taken after the 30 1 
days had elapsed for lack of jurisdiction. 
The complainant has moved to dismiss. the 
appeal on the ground that it was not filed w1thlll 
the thirty day period required by Section 7 ( c I 
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?f the Act, 7 ~.S.C.A. § 499 g(c). Of course, 
if the appeal is not timely, this court has no 
jurisdiction to entertain it. American Fruit 
Growers, Inc. v. Lewis D. Goldstein Fruit & 
Produce Corp., 78 F. S. 309 ( 1948) . 
In another case which involved an appeal under 
the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law, the Federal 
Court in interpreting the requirement of taking an 
appeal within the time specified in the statute stated: 
Litigants cannot trifle with Article 8307, 
Section 5. It goes beyond the ordinary statute 
of limitation. Its requirements are jurisdictional. 
Roberts v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, 
256 F. 2d 35 (1958). 
If there was an abuse of discretion on the part of 
the State Engineer in his decision of February 17, 
1955 appellants are now foreclosed from questioning 
it. Parties cannot sleep on their right of appeal and 
then at some late date come forth with the declaration 
that the decision of the State Engineer is void in 
order to get into court. If this were allowed there would 
never be a final decision of an administrative officer. 
The owner of the Award No. 228 obviously thought 
the decision was final because a new application to 
appropriate water (Application No. 26793, Defend-
ants' Exhibit No. 4) was filed on March 16, 1955. This 
filing was subsequently approved and is presently m 
good standing in the office of the State Engineer. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the evidence in this case we submit ' 
that the provisions of Section 73-1-4, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, were applicable when appellants' prede-
cessor ceased the use of this water. Further, when proof 
of resumption of use was not submitted as required 
1 
by the statute this water right was forfeited as a matter 
of law. The State Engineer clearly had the discretion 
and responsibility of advising the appropriator that 
he had failed to submit proof on time and that he could 
not accept proof of resumption of use after the proof ~ 
due date had expired. However, if there was one abuse 
of the Engineer's discretion in the matter, it was man-
datory that an appeal be taken within sixty days. 
Appellants are now foreclosed from reviewing the 
State Engineer's action in this matter. 
Respect£ ully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DALLIN ,V. JENSEN 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Utah State Engineer 
DA YID R. DAINES 
Attorney for Respondent 
Logan River Water Users' Association 
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